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INTRODUCTION 
Unchanging authoritarianism is assumed to be a persistent feature of governance in reformist 
China that consistently limits the scope of citizen action. Cycles of repression and relaxation 
may come and go but the basic contours of authoritarianism remain. This assumption lacks the 
nuance required to comprehend shifting state-labour relations in China. Different ‘shades’ of 
authoritarianism can shape the possibilities for civil action, constraining or extending the 
spaces where organising is tolerated. These shades can affect, too, the scope for workers 
organising collective action, the responses of state officials and the potential for finding new 
ways of addressing workers’ grievances.  
Given that the prospect of a well-organised and independent labour movement is anathema to 
authoritarian regimes, state-labour relations serve well as a barometer to gauge shades of 
authoritarianism. Given too that China remains nominally ‘a socialist state under the people's 
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and 
peasants’i, state-labour relations acquire an additional symbolic significance to the credibility 
(or otherwise) of the Communist Party of China (CPC). How the CPC balances repression with 
concession has consequences for production, capital accumulation and ultimately regime 
survival. Understanding these shades matters to the analysis of authoritarianism. 
To date, case-studies of state-labour relations in authoritarian regimes have not developed a 
theory of authoritarianism and state-labour relations that accounts for different shades of 
authoritarian governance. We address this gap by developing a framework for analysing shades 
of authoritarianism and state-labour relations across authoritarian regimes. We propose four 
ideal-type shades, namely, exploitative, protective, open and encapsulating. The effects of 
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these shades on state-labour relations are analysed in terms of approaches to resolving 
industrial conflicts, labour organising and labour-related policies and legislation. We argue that 
these shades are shaped by three political-economic contextual factors, namely, globalisation, 
development strategy and leadership approach to governance.  
In applying this framework to state-labour relations in China, we compare two periods of rule, 
namely, the ‘open’ Hu-Wen era from 2002-2012 and the ‘encapsulating’, Xi Jinping era from 
2012 onwards. In the more outward-looking, pragmatic Hu-Wen era, experimentation with 
different approaches and willingness to engage with perceived adversaries ‘outside the system’ 
(tizhi wai) became possible. Hence localised semi-organised labour action provoked some local 
governments to respond in new ways. Alternatively, in the more closed, disciplinary type of 
authoritarianism characteristic of the encapsulating Xi era, harder lines are drawn and 
innovation is restricted to sources from ‘inside the system’ (tizhi nei). 
The following section locates our framework of analysis within a broader theoretical literature 
on authoritarianism in general and recent research on authoritarianism in China in particular. 
We then present the framework itself with reference to changing state-labour relations in 
authoritarian regimes. In the subsequent two sections we apply this analytic framework 
respectively to the Hu-Wen period and the current Xi period.  The Xi period has already earned 
a reputation for being more repressive but Chinese leaders do not abandon entirely the legacy 
they inherit. In distinguishing ‘shades of authoritarianism’, we suggest that there are likely 
continuities as well as analytically untidy, fudged areas between shades. Both the continuities 
and breaks in state-labour relations and the ‘shades of authoritarianism’ underline the dynamic 
heterogeneity of authoritarianism.  
This article draws on over 20 years of extensive field-work by both authors on state-labour 
relations in China and discussions at a dedicated workshop in 2016 on this topic ii. Both 
researchers have undertaken documentary and interview-based work between 1987 and 2018 
on trade unions, grassroots trades unions elections, labour NGOsiii, the conditions of migrant 
workers, and worker resistance. This has included over 300 semi-structured interviews with 
trade union officials at central and local levels, workers, local government officials, labour 
studies academics, activist labour lawyers, labour NGOs and staff of civil society organisations. 




An authoritarian state is an illiberal regime with a concentration of power in a single despot or 
party that is not subject to democratic electoral processes and is propped up by a range of 
repressive security agencies. It is distinct from a totalitarian state in that there is space for 
citizen organising, plurality and independent thought (Brooker 2000; Arendt 1951; Friedrich 
and Brzezinski 1956; Schapiro 1972) but as we argue in this paper, the dimensions of this space 
are not fixed. Typically, an authoritarian state has the following distinguishing features: the 
absence of multi-party elections for determining succession; a civil society subject to 
surveillance and control; government-controlled media; lack of an independent judiciary and 
courts; hence weak rule of law, and restrictions on civil and political rights (Brooker 2000; 
Linz 1970; Wintrobe 1998; Diamond 2002). These features create particular governance 
problems for authoritarian regimes around succession, information deficits, accountability and 
stability (Wintrobe 1998). 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the political science literature on authoritarianism focussed on 
developing static, descriptive typologies such as military dictatorships, sultanism, one-party 
states, theocratic states, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and ‘socialist’ states (Linz 1970, 1975; 
O’Donnell 1973; Huntington and Moore 1970, Finer 1988; Tucker 1996; Petracca and Xiong 
1990; Ma 1990; Sautman 1992)  They mainly focussed on the goals and structures of regimes 
rather than explaining variations across time within authoritarian states or why certain shades 
of authoritarianism emerged in particular contexts. 
With the end of the Cold War and the ensuing wave of democratisation, scholars focussed their 
attention on emerging democracies and concomitant transitional challenges (Diamond 2002; 
Huntington 1991). As some fragile democracies gradually reverted to authoritarianism and 
others displayed hybrid forms of governance that included enduring authoritarian practices, 
political scientists turned their gaze again to authoritarian states. This not only led to studies 
on hybrid regimes and the reasons for the lack of democratic consolidation but also opened up 
new areas of investigation concerned with legitimacy, developmental performance, and 
durability of states such as China, Vietnam and Cuba (Diamond 2002; Mesquita and Smith 
2010; Gandhi and Przeworksi 2007; Geddes and Zaller 1989; Dickson et al, 2016). Studies on 
the relative economic performance of authoritarian states, the provision of public goods and 
institutional adaptability were important milestones in understanding the endurance of 
authoritarian regimes (Cassani 2017; Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Heilmann and Perry 
2011; Nathan 2003; Mazepus et al 2016).  
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However, whilst this research deepened understanding of authoritarianism, there was little 
theorisation of how authoritarianism affected state-labour relations and of how and why these 
effects vary across time within an authoritarian state. Though there is an abundance of case-
studies on state-labour relations in authoritarian regimes, these have mainly focussed on 
empirical narratives of state domination of labour rather than theoretical insights on the 
relationship between authoritarianism and state-labour relations. For example, Erol (2017) 
argues that the current era of Justice and Development Party (JDP) rule in Turkey represents 
‘a direct  continuity with the post-1980 authoritarian management of labour power’ as the JDP 
moved to institutionalise practices ‘disadvantageous to workers’ introduced in the years 
following the 1981 military coup (Celik 2015: 618). Chang (2002) acknowledges a ‘new form 
of labour relations’  in South Korea, but this does not end ‘coercive control over labour by the 
state’ (10) and the author offers no theoretical insights with regard to state-labour relations as 
to why this might be the case. Middlebrook (1995) develops ‘post-revolutionary 
authoritarianism’ as an analytical guide to the state’s historical domination of Mexican unions 
despite significant challenges. However, this approach does not explain how shifting 
allegiances in Mexico’s ruling class altered the forms of this domination, leaving the reader 
with an ‘oversimplistic view of the state as a know-all transhistorical monolothic actor’ 
(Brachet-Marquez 1996: 1110). Thus there remains an underlying assumption that 
authoritarian regimes are homogenous across time, without an appreciation of subtle, nuanced, 
dynamic shifts within the nature of authoritarianism that produce variations in state-labour 
relations.  
These gaps can also be identified in the literature on authoritarianism in China although China 
has not always been studied in terms of authoritarianism. During the Cold War decades, 
political analysts framed their discussion of China in terms of a ‘communist’ version of 
totalitarianism (Schapiro and Lewis, 1969; Friedrich and Brzenzinski, 1956). The study of 
China lay in the broader field of communist studies alongside Cuba, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, 
Mozambique and Tanzania (White et al, 1983). Maoism was treated as a distinct variety of 
both communism and totalitarianism with its focus on a dominant, charismatic leader, radical 
mass mobilisation, and privileging of ideology over economics (Maitan, 1976; Leys, 1978; 
Fairbank, 1992). With the adoption of market-oriented reforms from 1978, scholarly debates 
were framed in terms of transition and post-communismiv, shifting in the 1990s towards a frame 
of authoritarianism (Teets 2013; Lee and Zhang 2013; Lai 2016; Tang 2016).  
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We categorise the Chinese authoritarian state as a type of post-socialist state, that is, a state that 
is governed by a self-appointed and unelected communist party but pursues a capitalist 
economic direction, such as Vietnam and to some extent Cuba. Post-socialist states are distinct 
from the hybrid regimes that typify former Soviet states. The latter project a façade of 
democracy such as multi-party elections but retain significant authoritarian characteristics. 
Post-socialist states share continuities with former ‘socialist’ states but depart from them in 
several ways. They retain some state planning and enterprise although the economy is now 
driven by market principles fostering private enterprise. They have more plural civil societies 
but restrictions still limit their scale, influence and growth. Both former ‘socialist’ states and 
post-socialist states have developed legal regimes to regulate market-led growth but the 
judiciary and courts continue to have limited independence. Unlike former ‘socialist’ states, 
post-socialist states remain guided by a single, nominally Marxist Party which, through its 
capillary structures, dominates social relations at all levels.  
Nevertheless, post-socialist states have presided over significant changes to state-labour 
relations. Distinguishing features of state socialism such as employment security, relative pay 
equality and enterprise-based welfare have been replaced by fixed-term employment contracts, 
significant wage differentials, and social insurance-based statutory welfare schemes. In short, 
the re-introduction of capitalist labour relations has re-commodified labour. The political 
magnitude of the above has concealed the dynamic nature of many authoritarian regimes and 
obscured the processes of change, thus contributing to a gap in the literature.   
This absence of temporality in the literature is also a feature of research on the resilience of the 
CPC. The addition of various labels qualifying authoritarianism reflects an unease amongst 
China scholars with regard to the adequacy of the term ‘authoritarianism’ to capture political 
and social changes in China and an awareness that subtle shifts in state-civil society relations 
are a reflection of qualitatively different manifestations of authoritarianism – shades in our 
terminology. For example, words such as ‘consultative’ (Teets 2013:35), ‘bargaining’ (Lee and 
Zhang 2013), ‘resilience’ (Nathan 2003), ‘adaptive’ (Shambaugh 2008, Heilmann and Perry 
2011), ‘pragmatic’ (Lai 2016) and ‘populist’ (Tang 2016) have been deployed to qualify 
authoritarianism in China.  In Lee’s earlier work (2007), she links legal authoritarianism with 
processes of local capital accumulation and regime stability in the early Hu-Wen period. These 
descriptive qualifications of authoritarianism form part of a wider debate about the changes, 
durability and legitimacy of China’s political regime. 
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This literature is mainly restricted to the Hu-Wen period and offers scant theorisation of why 
changes in the form of authoritarianism happen, what drives changes and how they relate to 
other periods of rule. In contrast, we underline the importance of both periodising 
authoritarianism as a way to understand its shades and acknowledge continuities as well as 
breaks. In the next section, we present an analytical framework around the core theme of state-
labour relations that allows for distinctive shades of authoritarianism within broader politico-
economic contexts. It thus addresses both the gap in the general literature on authoritarianism 
and state-labour relations and variations across time using China as an illustrative case study.   
FRAMEWORK OF  ANALYSIS: SHADES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND STATE-
LABOUR RELATIONS.  
By state-labour relations we understand the interactions between state and labour in developing 
the conditions of employment and possibilities for labour organising in pursuit of collective 
class interests. We recognise, along with Jessop and others, that the state and civil society 
(within which labour organising sits) are not static and discrete categories, but rather involve 
contesting and co-operating agencies with both opposing and fused interests. In short, the state 
is a socially embedded site of contention (Jessop 2008:7).  
 
A key component of this framework is the idea that ‘shades’ of authoritarianism shape state-
labour relations. A ‘shade’ is an ideal-type manifestation of authoritarian governance 
exhibiting a distinct approach to state-labour relations that is nevertheless blurred at the edges. 
The ideal type is deployed as an abstract tool of analysis rather than an exact representation of 
reality. The four ideal-type shades are respectively exploitative, protective, open and 
encapsulating. They are distinguished by key dimensions of state-labour relations: resolution 
of industrial conflict, tolerance of labour organising and labour-related policies and legislation.   
Shades of authoritarianism change because of the ‘state’s function of regulating the terms and 
conditions of the capital-labour relationship’ (Jessop 2002:45) and the concomitant need to 
respond to collective labour agency in order to maintain capitalist development and regime 
stability. This political economy occurs in a wider context of globalisation, development 
strategy and leadership approach. When the state promotes a strategy of opening up to the 
global economy and export-led growth, there are consequences for how it organises labour. 
This often takes the form of fostering an investment-friendly environment by prohibiting trades 
unions and keeping labour costs competitive. In a global recession, the state has again to adjust 
7 
 
relations as decreasing export orders reduce the demand for labour and may heighten the 
likelihood of unrest. States seeking to upgrade their position in the value chain are likely to 
introduce labour-related policies that encourage skills investment and improved labour 
conditions. Maintaining social stability is important for ensuring stable growth, thus elevating 
the central relevance of state-labour relations.  
The table below outlines the relations between different shades of authoritarianism and our key 
dimensions: industrial conflict, labour organising and labour-related policies.   
Table 1: Shades of authoritarianism and state-labour relations 
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The main factors driving changes in shades relates to the need to maintain legitimacy through 
continued capitalist growth and ensure regime stability through management of state-labour 
relations. The shade of authoritarianism that emerges is driven by a conjuncture of factors such 
as globalisation, domestic development strategy, and leadership approach to governance. 
Having outlined a general framework of analysis for describing and explaining shades of 
authoritarianism and state-labour relations, we now apply this to the case of China.  
China: shades of authoritarianism 
In this sub-section we identify the shades of authoritarianism that characterise different 
phases of authoritarianism and their impact on state-labour relations. In particular we focus 
our attention on two periods of authoritarianism in China, namely, the Hu-Wen era (2002-
2012) and Xi Jinping era (2012 onwards). The dynamics of authoritarianism in these two eras 
is discussed in detail in the next two sections.  
 
Table 2: Shades of Authoritarianism in China 
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 Open  
Hu-Wen Era 
Encapsulating 
Xi Jinping Era 
Addressing Industrial 
Conflict 
 Pragmatic, outward-looking  
approach fostering 
innovation and 
experimentation such as 
grassroots trade union 
elections, arbitration 
committees, elected worker 
representatives involved in 
collective negotiation; street 
courts; forms of collective 
bargaining. 
Generalised awareness of 
employment laws.  
Strikes and labour unrest 
continue but state restricts 
innovation in collective 
bargaining or 
experimentation.  
Continuation of protection 
of labour. 
Clampdown on reporting of 
industrial conflicts and 
labour NGOs excluded from 
strikes and negotiation. 
Emphasis on role of Party-
led trade union as mediator 
between capital and labour. 
Labour Organising Growth and pluralisation of 
civil society organisations 
creates spaces for labour 
NGOs and other forms of 
labour organising such as 
activist law agencies. Local 
state harassment of labour 
NGOs but also toleration of 
activities such as legal 
education and advice. 
Labour NGOs invited to 
assist local states with 
service provision to workers. 
Room for progressive trade 
union leaders and local 
officials to innovate and 
form alliances with similar-
Role of state trade union as 
sole representative workers’ 
interests reasserted. State  
encourages cautious union 
reform so as to appease 
workers and provide 
credibility to state 
encapsulation of change 
processes. Limited room for 
reformist trade union leaders 
to improve workplace 
representation. Alliances 
between progressive trade 
union leaders, local officials 




minded academics, labour 
NGOs and activist lawyers.  
Room for labour NGOs to 
influence policy. 
Emergence of grassroots 
labour organisers and co-
ordinated strikes. 
Repression of labour NGOs 
and activist lawyers. Sub-
contracting of welfare and 
educational services to 
workers to qualifying 
labour/migrant NGOs. Party 
moves to establish cells in 
NGOs to ensure 
encapsulation and 
surveillance. State asserts 
role as main agency of 
change excluding influence 
of labour NGOs or labour 
activists. 
 
Labour-related Policies Expansion of laws and 
policies providing greater 
protection to workers and 
reducing discrimination 
against migrant workers. 
Trade unions open 
membership to migrant 
workers. Grassroots trades 
union elections; emphasis on 
workplace mediation; policy 
of repatriating migrants 
annulled.  
No new employment laws. 
Minor adjustments to 
existing policies. 
Sub-contracting policies that 
engage qualified labour 
NGOs encouraged.  
New Foreign NGO law 
constrains transfer of foreign 
funds to labour NGOs. No 
significant initiatives in 
state-labour relations.  
As noted above, these shades of authoritarianism in China are shaped by globalisation, 
development strategy and leadership approach to governance. This is illustrated in table 3 
below, where the columns refer to eras and the rows to factors affecting shades and the 
consequences for state-labour relations.  
Table 3: Factors affecting shades 
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 Hu-Wen  Xi Jinping 
Globalisation China goes global. Rapid 
expansion of trade and inward 
and outward foreign investment. 
Global financial crisis from 
2008. 
Global recession until 2012. 
Commitment to further opening 
through Belt and Road initiative.  
Development strategy Export-led model of economic 
growth complemented by Go 
Global strategy. Moves to 
economic rebalancing to address 
sector and geographic 
inequalities.  More focus on 
marginalised interests and 
engagement with society. 
Systematic development of 
welfare provision. 
Strategy of continued expansion 
through Belt and Road initiative. 
Emphasis on technical 
upgrading in value chain and 
innovation; enhancing domestic 
consumption.  
Engagement with civil society 
dominated by Party. 
Leadership approach to 
governance 
More emphasis on inclusion and 
redistribution reflected in 
ideological tropes of people-
centre development and 
harmonious society. 
Continued repression but more 
room for civil society to 
develop. Pragmatic approach 
towards civil society, fostering 
innovation, flexibility and 
adaptation. Move to engage 
more with social forces in local 
governance and welfare 
provision. 
Stability an ongoing concern. 
Reassertion of Party discipline 
and socialist ideology with 
Chinese characteristics.  
Nationalism emphasised and 
partial rejection of foreign 
influence.  
Party encapsulation of process of 
change. Policy priorities relate to 
anti-corruption and economic 
growth, fostering populism, and 
aimed at maintaining Party rule. 
Engagement with civil society 
on Party terms only. 
Sources of innovation and 
experimentation come from 
within the Party system. 
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Consequences for Shades More room for innovative and 
creative ways in addressing 
workers’ grievances and 
handling industrial conflict. 
Greater agency for workers and 
labour NGOs. 
Repressive approach to 
autonomous labour organising. 
Protective labour laws retained. 
Attempts by capitalists to 
weaken content of Labour 
Contract Law rejected, in part to 
maintain populist support base 
amongst workers. 
 
As the tables suggest, there is a conjuncture of factors such as globalisation, domestic 
development strategy and leadership approach that shape the shades of authoritarianism and 
affect the balance of state-labour-relations (see Diagram 1).  
Diagram 1: Politico-economic context  
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OPEN AUTHORITARIANISM:  HU-WEN ERA 
Migrant workers have played a key role in the success of China’s economic reforms but have 
been largely excluded from the benefits accrued from China’s opening up. Not only have 
marketization and commodification rendered migrant workers vulnerable to poor working 
conditions, but systemic rigidities around residence status, discriminatory migration policies 
and considerable urban stigmatisation of the migrant ‘other’ have barred them from enjoying 
full citizenship in China’s cities (Solinger 1999). Migrant workers’ children were not entitled 
to enter urban schools; workers could not access the urban health-care system, nor receive 
pensions (Huang et al 2010; Li 2006; Ye et al 2010). They could not be a trade union member, 
organise as an interest group, access state housing, or receive social security. It was during the 
Hu-Wen decade that there was a significant shift away from casting migrants as problematic 
towards a more empathic approach that sought to address gross inequality and grievances in 
the workplace. State approaches to industrial conflict and labour organising fed into changes 
in labour-related policies and legislation.  
Addressing Industrial Conflict: innovation and experimentation 
The open authoritarianism of the Hu-Wen era followed the Jiang Zemin period of leadership 
(1989-2002) that was biased towards industry and urban areas and neglected the grievances of 
both rural residents and migrant workers (Huang 2008). The Party/state at local level dealt with 
industrial unrest primarily through a combination of on-site concessions to protesting workers 
alongside overt threats of violence. Geographically disconnected but nevertheless widespread 
protests against the mass redundancies that accompanied state-owned enterprise restructuring 
came to a dramatic climax in the spring of 2002 with huge protests in North East China. 
Alarmed by the scale of protests, the authorities’ response was to avoid blanket repression and 
to target organisers. The Jiang administration also initiated the introduction of protective 
legislation such as the 1993 Regulations for the Handling of Labour Disputes and the 1994 
Labour Law to manage labour-capital relations and appease workers. 
At the coalface of industrial relations, the persistent pulse of strikes and pressure from the 
centre to resolve industrial disputes opened up opportunities for local governments, trades 
unions and workers to engage in new ways during the Hu-Wen era. These included extending 
the scope of the ACFTU to include migrant workers, experimentation with democratic trade 
union elections, resolving disputes through street courts (Su and Xin 2010), experimentation 
with collective bargaining, and elections of workers’ representatives in industrial conflicts. 
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Under pressure from the cadre appraisal system to maintain social order and from central 
leadership to find less blunt tools for resolving disputes, local leaders experimented with 
alternative ways of dealing with conflict that did not rely on outright repression.  
Under the Hu-Wen leadership, the central Party/state put further pressure on the ACFTU to 
play a more effective role in mediating and addressing migrant workers’ grievances. To this 
end, the 2003 State Council Office Circular enabled migrant workers to join the ACFTU 
(Croucher and Miles, 2010: 11). However, the ACFTU’s bureaucratic nature and its 
contradictory dual roles of promoting both worker and Party interests undermined its capacity 
to represent workers (Harper 1969; Taylor et al 2003; Lee 1986).  In any case migrants had 
little trust in the trade union, which was generally perceived as a spineless, bureaucratic 
organisation serving either Party or enterprise management interests – or both (White et al, 
1996; Lee 2007: 60; Pringle 2011). In order to enhance the effectiveness of grassroots trade 
unions, the ACFTU introduced democratic trade union elections, leaving it to local 
governments to implement these or not. Though many provincial and city trades unions failed 
to pick up the gauntlet, more enterprising trade union leaders in Guangdong and Zhejiang 
experimented with grassroots union elections (Howell 2008, Pringle 2011, Hui and Chan 2015). 
However, these experiments were limited to enterprises below a certain size and with a record 
of industrial peace.  
Experiments with collective bargaining took off during the first decade of the millennium, 
mainly in state enterprises. The tale of the 2010 Honda strikes and the wave of strikes that 
followed in its wake has been covered in the literature (Chan and Hui 2012; Kai 2013; Elfstrom 
and Kuruvilla 2014; Hui 2011; Lee, Brown and Wen 2016). Suffice it here to say that this 
created an opportunity for more progressive trade union leaders, labour NGOs and worker 
activists to initiate collective bargaining that included varying degrees of accountability via 
elected workers’ representatives (Pringle and Meng 2018). Despite post-election co-optation 
and harassment of some representatives, the idea of genuine elected worker representatives in 
collective bargaining was a major breakthrough in industrial relations that spread elsewhere 
and was infused with considerable symbolic import.  It was even more innovative because 
elections took place in enterprises experiencing unrest rather than industrial peace as had 
hitherto been the practice. 
These innovations signalled a softer, more nuanced approach based on negotiation which, it 
was hoped, was less likely to escalate unrest. The central government promoted this through 
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the cadre appraisal system, where rewards were tailored around reducing industrial conflict. 
There was also a strategic shift away from arresting strikers to engaging in dialogue with 
leaders, co-opting them through material means (Lee and Zhang 2015) and reserving targeted 
arrests for occasional use. 
Labour organising and labour NGOs.  
The era of open pragmatic authoritarianism was also characterised by a rapid expansion of civil 
society, including labour NGOs. Changing public attitudes, policies that sought to reduce 
inequalities, and a more inclusive approach to migrants made it possible for NGOs, the media, 
sympathetic trades unionists and local government officials to work directly around labour 
rights issues and experiment with alternative ways of addressing grievances. The post-Mao 
history of civil society and labour NGOs has been well documented. Rather than rehearse this 
again, we highlight four key points relevant to the argument.  
First, the period 2002-2012 stands out as the prime period of civil society expansion in China. 
Not only was there a rapid mushrooming of independent groups concerned with marginalised 
interests, including migrant workers (Howell 2004), but most new organisations were 
unregistered due not least to the significant bureaucratic hurdles (Hildebrandt 2011). Though 
accurate data do not exist, various estimates suggest there were almost 100 labour NGOs across 
the country by 2010, mainly in the Pearl River Delta (Chan 2012; Xu 2013, Howell 2015).  
Second, the links of some labour NGOs to external actors such as Hong Kong labour NGOs, 
trades unions, foundations, and international networks of labour research enabled innovation 
in labour activism (Chan 2011; Xu 2013; Pringle 2018). Labour NGOs introduced new ways 
of approaching workers, such as going to dormitories; using mobile buses to propagate rights; 
running services; offering legal advice and training; providing leadership support; and at a later 
stage advising on strikes and bargaining (Xu 2013; Chen and Yang 2017; Howell 2015). As 
labour NGOs made deeper inroads amongst workers, the ACFTU became increasingly 
concerned about the impact of institutional competition on their legitimacy.  
The third key point is the changing relationships between local state actors and civil society 
organisations, including labour NGOs. Whilst many local officials remained suspicious of 
NGOs and reluctant to sponsor their registration, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) was 
eager to harness NGOs for welfare service-delivery (Howell 2015; Hsu 2014). It was often 
thwarted in this by public security concerns about the destabilising potential of more rights-
based groups, especially those with foreign funding. In 2008, the MOCA established pilots to 
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promote the sub-contracting of welfare services to NGOs by removing the requirement to 
register with a government department, a key stumbling-block to registration (Howell 2015; 
Liao et al 2013). This kick-started a process of welfarist incorporation whereby government 
courted some service-delivery NGOs whilst clamping down on rights-based NGOs (Howell 
2015). Plans to tighten control over foreign funding also emerged, a move that was fully 
realised in the Xi era, highlighting continuities across the two shades of authoritarianism.  
Finally, the onset of the 2008 global financial recession led to factory closures, lay-offs of 
almost 20 million workers (Wangyi News Centre 2009) and growing labour unrest. From here 
onwards the Party/state made contradictory moves towards labour NGOs, courting some for 
service-delivery whilst increasing surveillance of others. Labour NGOs continued with their 
innovative approaches but the changing politico-economic context along with an imminent 
change in leadership generated uncertainty about their future role in the labour movement.  
Labour-related Policy and Legislative Changes  
The Hu-Wen era brought with it a more inclusive political discourse of `harmonious society’ 
and ‘people-centred development’ reflecting the new leadership’s concern with increasing 
inequality and social exclusion, issues that Jiang Zemin had drawn attention to at the end of his 
office. Occasionally violent protests in rural areas prompted reforms such as the re-introduction 
of rural co-operative medical care in 2002, abolition of agricultural tax in 2006 and 
modernisation of rural co-operatives in 2007courtsv  
In 2003 the death in a detention centre of Sun Zhigang, a rural graduate seeking employment 
in the city, was widely covered in the media, causing public outrage. His case symbolised 
institutionalised discrimination against rural migrants and often heavy-handed treatment from 
public security agencies. It marked a turning-point in government policy towards migrant 
workers. In 2003 the central government abolished the detention and repatriation system and 
the State Council Office issued a ‘Circular on Properly Carrying Out the Work of Employment 
Management and Service to Peasant Migrant Workers’.  In this way the Party could also ensure 
a steady flow of rural migrants to employers in coastal areas and stabilise capitalist 
development. This circular heralded a shift in the government’s perspective away from seeing 
rural migrants as a threat to social order towards viewing them as a social group with rights. 
This more ‘people-oriented’ approach of the Hu-Wen leadership found further expression in 
the 2006 ‘State Council’s Opinion on Solving the Issue of Migrant Workers’. Released in the 
same year as Hu Jintao’s conceptualisation of a ‘harmonious society’, the Opinion stated that 
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the government would address issues of social security, work injury insurance, medical 
insurance, pensions, and education for migrant workers’ children. It also committed to 
guaranteeing migrant workers’ democratic and political rights, though such language was more 
rhetorical than substantive. Although this was an Opinion rather than a binding law, it 
nevertheless signalled a shift towards improved treatment of migrant workers.  
Three important pieces of legislation were introduced. The Labour Contract Law (2008) sought 
to address the problem of workers being repeatedly re-employed on short-term contracts by 
requiring employers in Article 14 to concede permanent contracts to workers with ten 
consecutive years’ employment record. The Labour Disputes Mediation Law and Arbitration 
Law (2008) made dispute resolution procedures more flexible by extending the time permitted 
to file a complaint and reducing the cost for workers (Cooney, Biddulph and Zhu 2013). Article 
38 of the Social Insurance Law (2010) enabled injured workers to seek advance payment for 
treatment from compensation reserves. This was essential for migrant workers who could not 
afford to stay in the location of employment to seek injury compensation. These laws involved 
relatively wide consultation and aroused considerable opposition, not least from local 
governments, foreign investors and foreign chambers of commerce who argued that the 
relatively labour-friendly laws would act as a barrier to investment (Hui and Chan 2014, Chan 
2011, Froissart 2011).  
These new laws and policies signalled to local governments that they could undertake 
regulatory changes to benefit migrant workers at a time when the economic context was 
changing. With an emerging labour shortage from mid-2000s in Guangdong province and other 
coastal areas, the bargaining power of migrant workers to improve conditions increased, 
eventually generating experiments in collective bargaining that continued in to the Xi era. It is 
within this context that various local governments responded with initiatives to address the 
working conditions of migrants, such as Zhejiang provincial government’s step to gradually 
replace the temporary residence certificate system with a residence certificate system (Zhao 
2008; 2010).  
ENCAPSULATING AUTHORITARIANISM: XI ERA  
Viewed through a labour lens, the open authoritarianism of the Hu-Wen era allowed space for 
innovation, catalysed by labour unrest, inspired by labour NGOs working outside the system 
(tizhi wai)  and unions at various levels of the ACFTU on the inside (tizhi nei). Labour NGOs’ 
interventions in strikes in Guangdong continued well into the Xi era and the significant impact 
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of labour NGOs on labour relations spanned both administrations. However, even as 
innovations such as collective bargaining maintained momentum into 2015, the operational 
space for those labour NGOs and labour lawyers was narrowing as Xi Jinping consolidated his 
leadership.  
In this section we examine changes and continuities in policies, state-labour relations and the 
approach to civil society, including labour NGOs, in the Xi era. We argue that Party-disciplined 
authoritarianism under Xi Jinping is a stronger shade of authoritarian rule less open to 
influences external to the Party – especially if connected to foreign-funded NGOs –and 
ruthlessly intent on regime survival. It is premised on emergent uncertainties in the global 
economy, containing dissent, and providing sufficient public goods. This constitutes a 
reconfiguration of state-society relations with a focus on reasserting Party control but does not 
rule out innovation and even adaptation. 
Addressing Industrial Conflict: the end of innovation? 
Workers’ increased knowledge of rights and labour shortages facilitated a transition from 
individualised juridical grievance solutions to some form of unofficial collective bargaining 
(Chen and Tang 2013; Pringle 2013). Spanning the end of Hu-Wen era and early years of Xi’s 
rule, these changes were most prominent in Guangdong where a combination of labour 
shortages, relatively high levels of tolerance towards labour NGOs and forward-looking 
political leadership pushed open authoritarianism to new levels of innovation. These included 
annual collective bargaining in Guangzhou’s auto-sector (Pringle 2017) and even an invitation 
to selected non-foreign-funded Labour NGOs to work with the Guangdong Federation of Trade 
Unions on labour rights (Howell, 2015).   
The labour militancy that drove these innovations also underpinned increasingly militant 
interventions in strikes by labour NGOs. The enthusiasm for collective bargaining from non-
state actors grew not just among labour NGO practitioners but also amongst academics. From 
2010 to 2014, a string of conferences debated the lessons from Guangdong and legal 
protections for a new layer of elected labour representatives working both inside and outside 
the ACFTU. Indeed, the capacity of experienced labour representatives such as Meng Han, Wu 
Guijun, Xian Dajin and labour NGOs to influence the outcome of strikes was dramatically 
illustrated by the nine month dispute at Lide Shoe Factory in Panyu, Guangdong, the immediate 
outcome of which was greeted as a major victory for the labour movement (Lin 2015).     
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Official statistics from labour arbitration and the courts show that labour disputes remain at 
high levels (China Labour Statistics Yearbook 2016: 343). In late 2015, there were signs that 
workers in China were co-ordinating strikes and even collective negotiations across different 
regions. In November 2016 Coca-Cola workers in Chengdu, Chongqing and Jilin and agency 
workers at the FAW-Volkswagen plant in Changchun called respectively for improved trade 
union representation and use of collective negotiations to settle disputes (CLB 2017). While 
these disputes involved police interventions and at least one arrest in Changchun, the ongoing 
labour militancy suggests that tighter Party control over society during the Xi era has not 
automatically led to a decrease in labour militancy. Indeed, Xi met with ACFTU leaders on 
two occasions in 2013 and 2015 and ordered a blueprint and timetable for improved trade union 
representation. This strengthened the strategy to ensure that change and innovation occurred 
under Party auspices but also indirectly linked the continuing trend of strikes with poor 
representation. There is thus a careful balance between permitting expression and resolution of 
grievances and maintaining social stability and capitalist production that draws on 
experimentation from the period of open pragmatic authoritarianism, even as non-state actors 
behind innovation are subject to repression.  
Labour Organising and Labour NGOs 
Xi’s construction of a populist ‘strong man’ image has served as the political backdrop for new 
laws to regulate an expanded civil society. The authoritarian shading is a complex blend of 
continuity and change and is designed to ensure that civil society in general and labour NGOs 
in particular are restricted to acting as apolitical service-providers rather than campaigners and 
organisers. As a signal of government intent, the Charity Law (2016) was cautiously welcomed 
by civil society practitioners and academics as an ‘enabling’ law (Shieh 2016). In contrast, the 
Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organisations’ Activities Within 
Mainland China (hereafter Foreign NGO Law), effective from 1 January 2017, was widely 
deemed to be ‘controlling’ (Shieh 2016). Part of this anxiety lay in the securitisation of civil 
society implicit in the transfer of management of foreign NGOs from the MOCA to the 
Ministry of Public Security (Gan 2017). Articles 41 and 42 of the Foreign NGO Law give 
police the power to enter NGO offices or project sites, copy materials, shut down offices, seize 
property such as computers and freeze bank accounts.   
On the ground, the securitisation of civil society has generated waves of repression across 
various sectors of civil society previously emboldened during the era of open authoritarianism 
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under Hu-Wen era, such as the Feminist Five, human rights lawyers, investigative journalists, 
and religious practitioners. For labour NGOs, the nadir came with the coordinated detention of 
23 labour activists across Guangdong in December, 2015. Four people connected to the Panyu 
Migrant Workers Centre were later charged and sentenced for ‘gathering a crowd to disrupt 
public order’.  
Combined with the Foreign NGO Law, these measures have had a sobering impact on civil 
society organisations. Yet the revised political-legal configuration of state-civil society 
relations does not spell the end of pragmatic measures using experimentation and innovation 
altogether. Rather, pragmatism is now encapsulated in an inward-looking Party discipline. Nor 
does it herald the end of independent, non-state activity. Given the proliferation of NGOs over 
two decades and the fact that many combine service provision with campaigning, organising 
and even resistance at times, Xi cannot easily eliminate organisations deemed undesirable. As 
Howell (2015) noted, the foreign NGO law demonstrates well a strategy to promote service-
oriented NGOs and contain rights-based groups. Foreign NGOs can still operate but within a 
confined framework around service provision, albeit heavily constrained by the new law.  
The growth of labour NGOs has been inextricably linked to workers’ capacity to organise 
collective action which, in turn, takes us back to the ACFTU itself. To varying degrees, labour 
NGOs form part of the ‘power from below’ (Pringle 2014) that generates pressure on the 
ACFTU to increase its capacity to protect members’ rights and interests. This pressure on the 
ACFTU provokes Chinese leaders into demanding better results from the union, especially 
heading off strikes that may threaten widespread social unrest such as the 40,000 strong shoe 
workers’ strike at the Yue Yuen plant in 2014. As already noted, in 2015 Xi issued a second 
instruction to the ACFTU to develop a reform programme to improve labour relations. While 
some provincial unions put forward plans that include collective negotiations between 
employers and unions in workplaces, the response to date has been slow. The ACFTU’s 
Leading Group on Trade Union Pilots in Trade Union Reform made only a passing reference 
to workplace collective negotiation or trade union elections in a work report issued in 2017 
(ACFTU 2017).  
Labour-related Policy and Legislative changes  
In political terms, the most far-reaching policy initiative of the Xi era has been the anti-
corruption campaign. While the CPC has regularly conducted such campaigns in the past, they 
have not attained the levels of ‘zeal and acumen’ apparent in Xi’s determination to render China 
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a country where ‘officials are unable and unwilling to be corrupt’ (China File, 2016). Scholars 
have argued that Xi’s willingness to go after ‘tigers’ – senior CPC figures – as well as ‘flies’ – 
provincial- and county-level cadres – has left him exposed (Shambaugh 2015). On the other 
hand, the Hong Kong-based labour NGO China Labour Bulletin (CLB) argues that Xi ‘cannot 
afford to sacrifice’ his popularity among working people gained through his anti-corruption 
campaign precisely because of the political isolation that Shambaugh highlights (CLB, 2017).  
Compared to the Hu-Wen era, the Xi era has not initiated regulatory changes in industrial 
relations. However some provinces have passed regulations on collective negotiations. The 
Guangdong Province Regulations on Enterprise Collective Contracts (2015) were variously 
interpreted as either part of Xi’s negative influence on workplace participation or a reaction to 
workplace militancy that forced the Guangdong government to regulate. The Regulations 
stipulated that employers must agree to collective negotiations when more than half the 
workforce demanded them, a higher figure than the 30 per cent in an earlier draft. Some labour 
NGOs regard the Regulations as a significant setback to earlier hopes, although the ILO office 
in Beijing was more optimistic stating that the Regulations ‘establish[es] a legal framework for 
collective bargaining’ (ILO 2015).  
In sum, the Xi era is one of Party-disciplined authoritarianism that has isolated itself from non-
Party influences as far as possible and cleansed itself of corrupt cadres as deemed necessary. 
Whilst there have been not been the kind of major policy or legal changes to industrial relations 
that distinguished the Hu-Wen era, the central government has urged the ACFTU to reform 
itself to better represent workers and shore up Party legitimacy.  
Both eras demonstrate how shades of authoritarianism shape state-labour relations as observed 
in the shifts and continuities in addressing industrial conflict, labour organising and labour-
related policies and legislation. What this portends for the future impact of labour NGOs on 
industrial relations lies in part with labour NGOs themselves and how they negotiate the 
increased drift towards a securitisation of civil society management. The Foreign NGO Law’s 
requirement that NGOs register with the Public Security Bureau is already generating a climate 
of uncertainty and reducing the appetite for innovation. As a police force, Public Security 
Bureau officials will have a default setting towards political risk and preventing perceived 
security risks. This is likely to translate into a lower tolerance of labour NGOs deemed as 
having been involved in organising strikes and labour protests. For labour NGOs, navigating 
these changes requires new strategies, skills and relationships. On the other hand, organising 
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strikes and labour protests has never been the core work of even the most radical labour NGOs. 
Even in the more open pragmatic authoritarianism of the Hu-Wen era, the focus of labour 
NGOs interventions was on resolving strikes rather than organising them.  
CONCLUSION  
This article argues for a more nuanced approach to authoritarianism that recognises its dynamic, 
heterogeneous features across time. This matters not least for understanding how different 
shades of authoritarianism shape the scope for workers’ organising around grievances and how 
the state responds. Given the lack of theoretical insight in the literature, we developed a 
framework of analysis linking shades of authoritarianism and state-labour relations. We 
identified four different shades of authoritarianism, namely, exploitative, protective, open and 
encapsulating. These shades give rise to particular types of state-labour relations as seen in 
resolving industrial conflict, labour organising and labour-related policies and legislation. This 
occurs within a broader political-economic environment shaped by globalisation, development 
strategy and leadership approach and motivated by the need for regime stability and sustaining 
stable capitalist development. The dynamics of this framework were illustrated through the 
lens of post-socialist China during the Hu-Wen and Xi eras. 
The Hu-Wen era corresponded to an open, authoritarian shade and the Xi era reflects an 
encapsulating shade. In an open shade of authoritarianism, opportunities for organisational 
development, activism and influence emerge. The evolving legal and policy framework for 
labour relations in the Hu-Wen era generated a sense of optimism and progress premised on 
workers’ capacity to extract concessions from employers and local government authorities. 
Driven by concerns over stability, open pragmatic authoritarianism looked beyond the Party 
for input into the formulation of policy and law that envisioned a harmonious balance between 
CPC rule and civil society. Encouraged by working class militancy, labour NGOs responded 
with cautious confidence. 
An encapsulating shade of authoritarianism does not exclude reform. Rather, it envisages 
innovation and experimentation falling entirely under Party control, with the potential for civic 
interventions becoming more constrained. The lines between those working ‘inside the system’ 
(tizhi nei) and outside the system (tizhi wai) are now much bolder. To date, the Xi era has 
comprised a mixture of controlling and enabling laws that have generated a sense of profound 
pessimism. Party-disciplined authoritarianism, driven by concerns over the CPC’s legitimacy 
and even survival, has looked to its own organisations for innovation. Whether encapsulating 
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authoritarianism can leave room for non-Party influence in policy and its implementation in 
industrial relations remains to be seen. Ongoing labour militancy suggests that this approach is 
not working well and that labour NGOs are important to the resolution of strikes and unrest. If 
so, then a less repressive approach may be the key to ensuring stability and production.  
In practice boundaries between shades can be messy and fudged, allowing thus for continuities 
as well as ruptures between shades. Protective legislation introduced in the Hu-Wen era has 
not been repealed under Xi’s administration. Labour activism in the form of strikes and protests 
has also continued in the Xi era. Furthermore, labour NGOs continue to operate, despite 
restrictions. This suggests that the encapsulating shade does not guarantee full control over 
labour organising. There is a residual legacy of confidence, learning and strategic thinking that 
has become sedimented, shaping in turn the potential of Party-disciplinary authoritarianism to 
wield full control.  
As illustrated through the China case, this attempt at theory-building provides a starting-point 
for deepening understanding of shifting state-labour relations in different shades of 
authoritarianism. Whether this framework of analysis can apply to other types of 
authoritarianism than the post-socialist state remains to be tested. Further application of this 
framework to other contexts and sectors will be useful in revealing areas for analytic 
adjustment and refinement. Moreover, this approach can also be useful in aiding practical 
strategizing for labour activists as shades of authoritarianism shift over time.  Overall, the 
framework contributes to a more nuanced analysis of authoritarianism that reveals subtle 
changes and temporal heterogeneity. 
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